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THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP WITH A CORPORATE
GENERAL PARTNER - FEDERAL TAXATION -
PARTNERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION?
by P. Mike Allison
Recently there has been an increasing number of limited partnerships
formed with a corporation as the sole general partner.1 This arrangement
combines primary advantages of both the partnership and the corporation
-direct receipt of profits and losses by the partners without taxation at
the organizational level, and limited liability for all members of the organ-
ization. There is some doubt, however, that this type of organization will
be treated for tax purposes as a partnership. An indication of the uncer-
tainty is the following statement published in a prospectus offering limited
partnership shares to the public:
There is no guaranty that the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations pro-
mulgated thereunder will not further be amended in such a manner as to
deprive the Partnership and the Partners of any tax benefits prospective
investors in the Partnership may contemplate. If for any reason the Partner-
ship is treated for tax purposes as an association taxable as a corporation
rather than a partnership, the Partnership will be required to pay taxes upon
its income, distributions to Partners may be taxable to such Partners and will
not be deductible in computing the Partnership's taxable income and, in
addition, interest paid on the Partnership's obligations, depreciation taken
on Partnership properties and other deductible items will be deductible only
by the Partnership rather than being passed through to the Partners.2
No doubt the necessity for this caveat is created by the concern of the
Internal Revenue Service over the increased use of the limited partnership
with a corporate general partner. In the past, limited partnerships have
been used primarily as a means of affording investors limited liability
without the formalities of incorporating. The classical concept of the
limited partnership is that of a person or persons managing a business
which is financed by someone who is merely an investor and does not
participate in the management. The general partner has all the rights and
powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a
general partnership.' The limited partner has only the basic rights of being
able to obtain full information about the partnership, to share in profits,
and to have a dissolution and winding up by court decree when he is given
the right to dissolve.4 Generally, a limited partner is only liable for part-
'As evidence of this, during the period from July 20 through September 20, 1969, 38% of the
121 limited partnership certificates filed with the Texas Secretary of State had a corporation as
their sole general partner. Letter from Ivon Lee III, Counsel to the Secretary of State, to Mike
Allison, Oct. 11, 1969. During the period from Jan. 1 through Feb. 28, 1970, 40% of the 141
limited partnerships filed in Texas had a corporate general partner. Letter from Donald W. Ray,
Legal Counsel to the Secretary of State, to Mike Allison, Mar. 13, 1970.
3 1970 Fund of Properties, Ltd., Preliminary Prospectus, April 1, 1970, at 5.
3 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9.4 Id. § 10.
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nership debts to the extent of his capital contribution.5 However, he may
be liable as a general partner under certain circumstances, for example, if
he exercises control of the business.'
Limited liability is an attractive feature offered by both limited partner-
ships and corporations, but limited partnerships offer a tax feature un-
available to the corporation, which is subject to "double taxation."' In the
partnership structure the partners are credited with the profits and losses
of the business pro rata as individuals8 This pass-through of profits and
losses to the partners with no taxation at the organizational level is es-
pecially attractive in operations which generate large amounts of tax de-
ductions. The main areas in which substantial deductions occur are in oil
and gas operations, in which intangible drilling cost write-offs and per-
centage depletion are available, and in real estate development, in which
accelerated depreciation is allowed. Although many of the tax benefits
have been reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,' there are still sufficient
tax advantages to make the use of limited partnerships attractive."
Regulations promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code provide that
the manner in which a business organization will be taxed depends upon
its classification as either an association, partnership, or trust, and not
the name attributed to the organization by state law or by its owners." The
5 Id. S 17(1).
8 Id. 5 7. For other circumstances giving rise to unlimited liability, see text accompanying notes
77-79 infra.
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 11 imposes a tax on corporate income, and id. § 1 imposes a tax
on individual income which, under id. 5 61(a) (7), includes dividends; hence the income of a
corporation is taxed at the corporate level and again when it is distributed to the stockholders.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 701. A "Subchapter S Corporation," provided for under id. 55
1371-78, is taxed in a manner similar to a partnership, but qualifying corporations are limited to
ten or less natural persons as stockholders and are subject to many restrictions.9 Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Among
the benefits reduced are (1) limiting the use of double declining balance and sum of the years'
digits methods depreciation solely to new residential rental property, Tax Reform Act of 1969,
§ 521(a), adding INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(j)-(1), relettering (j) as (m); (2) requiring
100% recapture of post-1969 excess depreciation on real property other than residential rental
property, Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 521(b), amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 1250(a);
(3) limiting the deduction allowed individuals for interest on funds borrowed for investment pur-
poses for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1971, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 5 221 (a), adding
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, 5 163(d), relettering (d) as (e); (4) reducing the percentage depletion
in oil and gas operations from 27Y2% to 22%', Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 501(a), amending
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 613(b)(1); (5) increasing the alternative tax rate for net long-term
capital gains for individuals, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 5 511(b), amending INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 1201; (6) making all taxpayers liable for a minimum tax on tax preference items which
include excess investment interest, accelerated depreciation, net lease-personal property, fast write-
off for certified pollution control facilities and railroad rolling stock in excess of normal depreciation,
stock options, bad debt deductions of financial institutions, excess of depletion allowable over ad-
justed basis of the property at year's end, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 5 301 (a), adding INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, 5§ 56-58; (7) repealing the investment credit, Tax Reform Act of 1969, §§
703(a)-(c), amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 46, 47, and adding § 49; (8) reducing the
benefits of charitable contributions of appreciated property, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 5 201,
amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 170; and (9) reducing the benefits from a bargain sale to
charity, Tax Reform Act of 1969, 5 201, amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1011.
" The pass-through of partnership profits and losses to the partners is the primary attraction,
but a partner is allowed a loss only to the extent of the adjusted basis of his partnership inter-
ests. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704(d). A partner can, however, increase the basis of his part-
nership interest by assuming a portion of the partnership liabilities, as this is considered a contri-
bution of money by the partner to the partnership under id. § 752(a). Thus a partner can deduct
a greater amount of loss than the investment that he makes in his partnership shares.
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (1960).
COMMENTS
Regulations establish the standards for determining the class in which an
organization belongs, but local law governs as to whether the legal rela-
tionships which have been established in the formation of an organization
are such that the standards are met.1" As a result, in order to determine the
classification of an organization, it is necessary to closely examine appli-
cable laws in the state where the organization is formed. Since limited
partnerships, like corporations, are creatures of statutory law,1" both part-
nership and corporate laws must be examined to determine the proper tax
classification of a limited partnership with a corporate general partner.
After describing the prevalent statutory schemes which govern limited
partnerships with a corporate general partner, this Comment will discuss
the various considerations which have been involved in classifying this type
of organization, and will attempt to evaluate the unofficial position of the
Internal Revenue Service.
I. STATE PARTNERSHIP AND CORPORATION LAWS
Power of a Corporation To Become a Partner. In most states, limited part-
nerships are governed by statutes based on the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act' (hereinafter referred to as ULPA) and the Uniform Partner-
ship Act (hereinafter referred to as UPA). The ULPA defines a limited
partnership as "a partnership formed by two or more persons . . . having
as members one or more general partners and one or more limited part-
ners."'" The UPA, which applies to limited partnerships except where in-
consistent with limited partnership provisions,"7 defines "persons" to in-
clude individuals, partnerships, corporations, and other associations." No-
where does the ULPA disqualify a corporation from becoming a partner;
21id. § 301.7701-1(c).
aSee Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939).
146 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 559 (master ed. 1969) lists the 45 jurisdictions which have
adopted the Act: Alaska (1917), Arizona (1943), Arkansas (1953), California (1949), Colorado
(1931), Connecticut (1961), District of Columbia (1962), Florida (1943), Georgia (1952),
Hawaii (1943), Idaho (1919), Illinois (1917), Indiana (1949), Iowa (1924), Kansas (1967),
Maryland (1918), Massachusetts (1923), Michigan (1931), Minnesota (1919), Mississippi (1964),
Missouri (1947), Montana (1947), Nebraska (1939), Nevada (1931), New Hampshire (1937),
New Jersey (1919), New Mexico (1947), New York (1922), North Carolina (1941), North
Dakota (1959), Ohio (1957), Oklahoma (1951), Pennsylvania (1917), Rhode Island (1930),
South Carolina (1960), South Dakota (1925), Tennessee (1919), Texas (1955), Utah (1921),
Vermont (1941), Virgin Islands (1957), Virginia (1918), Washington (1945), West Virginia
(1953), and Wisconsin (1919).
"Id. at I lists the 42 jurisdictions which have adopted the Act: Alaska (1917), Arizona
(1954), Arkansas (1941), California (1949), Colorado (1931), Connecticut (1961), Delaware
(1947), District of Columbia (1962), Idaho (1919), Illinois (1917), Indiana (1949), Kentucky
(1954), Maryland (1916), Massachusetts (1922), Michigan (1917), Minnesota (1921), Missouri
(1949), Montana (1947), Nebraska (1943), Nevada (1931), New Jersey (1919), New Mexico
(1947), New.York (1919), North Carolina (1941), North Dakota (1959), Ohio (1949), Okla-
homa (1955), Oregon (1939), Pennsylvania (1915), Rhode Island (1957), South Carolina (1950),
South Dakota (1923), Tennessee (1917), Texas (1961), Utah (1921), Vermont (1941), Virgin
Islands (1957), Virginia (1918), Washington (1955), West Virginia (1953), Wisconsin (1915),
and Wyoming (1917).
1 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1.
"rUNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 5 6(2). A Texas court of civil appeals specifically held that the
provisions of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act are applicable to limited partnerships organized
under the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Horn v. Builders Supply Co., 401 S.W.2d 143
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.e.
'1 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 5 3.
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therefore, in states which have passed both uniform acts without modifying
the appropriate sections, or in states which have similar provisions and
definitions, corporations are not prohibited by partnership law from be-
coming either general or limited partners."9 A comment to the UPA points
out that the question of the capacity of a corporation to become a partner
is a matter of corporate law."
A great many of the courts which have considered the capacity of a
corporation to become a partner have adopted a rule that, unless expressly
authorized by statute or charter, corporations do not ordinarily have the
power to become partners.2 This general rule is based on two lines of
reasoning. One is that the mutual agency relation between partners, allow-
ing each to share in the management of the business, conflicts with the
statutory requirement of board of director control of corporate activi-
ties.2" The other rationale views management's entrance into a partnership
arrangement as a move which subjects corporate assets to risks and liabilities
not contemplated by the stockholders at the time they invested." The
general rule seems to be designed to protect stockholders and not to pro-
hibit some violation of public policy concerning the partnership arrange-
ment itself. However, its prohibition does not apply in states which have
adopted the wording of the Model Business Corporation Act, because that
Act expressly authorizes a corporation's participation in partnerships."
Texas, New York, and Delaware are among states which authorize cor-
"OSee Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942), aff'g sub noma. Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Pope, 178 Tenn. 580, 161 S.W.2d 211 (1941). States and territories which have
passed both the UPA and ULPA are as follows: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands. See notes 14 and 15 supra. Texas has passed the ULPA in substantially the same form
and content. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (1962). Texas has also passed the UPA in
substantially the same form and content. See TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (1962). Al-
though Delaware has not adopted the ULPA, its partnership act is the same as the UPA as to
definitions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501, 1502 (1953). The limited partnership definitions are
also similar. Id. 5 1506(b). Further, its limited partnership statutes do not disqualify corporations
from becoming partners. Id. 5§ 1701-12. New York's adaptations of the Uniform Acts do not
change the definition of "person." N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 2 (McKinney 1948). The application
of the partnership act to limited partnerships is also unchanged, and New York law does not
prohibit corporations from becoming partners. Id. § 10(2).
0 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), Comment.2 1 In Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 191 S.W.2d 716 (1945),
the Texas supreme court held that where a corporation's charter does not permit the forming of
partnerships, it is against the public policy of the state for the corporation to enter into such a
relationship. This rule was reiterated in J. Robert Neal, Inc. v. McElveen, 320 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959). New York cases stating this rule are People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121
N.Y. Civ. Proc. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (Ct. App. 1890), and Frieda Popkov Corp. v. Stack, 198 Misc.
826, 103 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Other states which appear to follow this general rule are
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 917, 920
(1958). See also 6 W. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 2520 (perm. ed. 1950, Supp. 1963).
22People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (Sup. Ct.
1890); Sabine Tram Co. v. Bancroft, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 40 S.W. 837 (1897), error ref.;
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 917, 927 (1958).2
3Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 917, 930 (1958).24 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4(g) (1969).
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porate participation in partnerships.' It would seem that in states which
have no statutory language either authorizing or prohibiting such partici-
pation, a corporate charter can provide the authorization." Where there is
statutory language or charter authority, it is likely that a court would hold
that a corporation could become a partner."
Although the reasons for the rule that prohibits a corporation from be-
coming a partner unless authorized by statute or charter have some rele-
vance in situations involving general partnerships, they are not logically
applicable to limited partnerships which have a corporation as the sole
general partner. Where the corporation is the sole general partner, the
management of the corporation is not shared by anyone other than the
corporation's directors and shareholders because under the ULPA only the
general partner has the right to manage the business." Since the corporation
is the only "person" with the right to manage, its assets are not subjected
to uncontemplated risks created by the actions of other general partners."
Under many present state statutes, it is not difficult to form a limited
partnership with a corporate general partner. For example, in Texas a
corporation can be formed with a minimum capital of $1,000.30 Once the
corporate charter is granted, a limited partnership certificate with the
necessary data required,2 ' naming a corporation as the general partner, can
"aTEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(a) (7) (1956); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAWS § 202(a) (15)
(McKinney 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(11) (Supp. 1968).
26 If the original charter does not provide authority, it could be amended. The procedures re-
quired for amending corporate charters are set out in ABA-ALI MODE.L Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §
54 (1969); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02 (1956); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAWS §§ 803-06
(McKinney 1961 and Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 242(d) (1968).
"In Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956), the Supreme
Court of Texas issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Texas Secretary of State to receive and
file a limited partnership certificate in which a corporation was to become a limited partner in a
limited partnership involving trusts. The corporation's charter granted the right to act as trustee
under any lawful express trust. The court held that prior to the new Corporation Code, a cor-
poration could not enter into a partnership, but under a corporation statute that permitted a
corporation to act as trustee and where the charter granted such power, it was legally qualified as
a person to become a member of a limited partnership. Other states which appear to hold this
view are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 917, 920 (1958). See also Note, Corporations-
Corporate Powers and Liabilities-Partnership-Power of a Corporation To Enter Into a Limited
Partnership--Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 291 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1956), 35 TEXAS
L. REV. 265 (1957).
28 UNIFORM LrMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 gives the general partner all the rights and powers
of a partner in a partnership without limited partners except for seven enumerated acts going to
the basic structure of the partnership that cannot be done without authorization from the limited
partners. Id. § 7 limits the liability of a limited partner only as long as he does not take part in
the control of the business. See notes 77-80 infra, and accompanying text. It therefore seems reason-
able that limited partners will not be sharing in the management of the partnership.
' In fact, the situation is one in which the corporation exercises sole control over more assets
than the stockholders may have contemplated.
"
0 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.05 (1956).
at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 3 (1962).
(a) Two (2) or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall:
(1) Sign and swear to a certificate, which shall state:
(A) The name of the partnership.
(B) The character of the business.
(C) The location of the principal place of business.
(D) The name and place of residence of each member; general and limited partners
being respectively designated.
(E) The term for which the partnership is to exist.
(F) The amount of cash and a description of the agreed value of the other property
contributed by each limited partner.
1970]
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be filed with the Secretary of State, together with a filing fee of $ 2 5.a Fol-
lowing these formalities creates a valid limited partnership. 3
Problem of Control. Participation in the control of the business by a limited
partner 4 has long been a problem connected with limited partnerships
because there is little guidance as to what degree of participation is neces-
sary before a limited partner will be held liable as a general partner."'
California is the only state in which the state partnership act sets out a list
of activities a limited partner may engage in without becoming a general
partner.' However, these permissible activities go to the very structure of
(G) The additional contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner
and the times at which or events on the happening of which they shall be
made.
(H) The time, if agreed upon, when the contribution of each limited partner is
to be returned.
(1) The share of the profits or the other compensation by way of income which
each limited partner shall receive by reason of his contribution.
(J) The right, if given, of a limited partner to substitute an assignee as contributor
in his place, and the terms and conditions of the substitution.
(K) The right, if given, of the partners to admit additional limited partners.
(L) The right, if given, of one or more of the limited partners as to contributions
or as to compensation by way of income, and the nature of such priority.
(M) The right, if given, of the remaining general partner or partners to continue
the business on the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner.
(N) The right, if given, of a limited partner to demand and receive property other
than cash in return for his contribution.
"i1d. § 3(a)(2).
33Id. § 3(b). A limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial compliance in good
faith with the requirements of paragraph (a). This would seem to override the tests of common
law and the Texas Partnership Act for determining whether or not a partnership exists. Although
the statutory language appears clear on the matter of the formation of a valid limited partnership,
a court might decide that there is no valid limited partnership where a corporate general partner
has only insignificant assets. This possibility exists because the underlying policy is that in a
limited partnership someone should be subject to unlimited liability. Although there is justification
for such an argument, once a limited partnership is formed under the statutory scheme, an attack
on its validity would be most successful where fraud or deceit are proved. Regardless of the reason
for a court ruling that an organization was not a valid limited partnership, its holding the partners
liable as general partners would most likely be conclusive that under state law the organization
is a general partnership, especially where there is a finding of associates entering into business for
profit. Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925); Wells v. McKay Tel.-Cable
Co., 239 S.W. 1001, 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
84 Such participation makes one liable as a general partner. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 7.
5"[N]o relevant source-the statute, the Commissioners' notes explaining the ULPA, or the
cases-gives precise guidelines for determining the nature and quantity of activity which violates
the control test." Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1471,
1474 (1969). "Neither the Act nor the decisions under it are very helpful on the critical question
of how much review, advisory, management selection, or veto power a limited partner may have
without being regarded as taking part in control. The resulting uncertainty is probably the greatest
drawback of the limited partnership form." J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIPS 147 (1968).
" UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7, Comment (master ed. 1969); 25 CAL. CORP.
CODE § 15507 (West Supp. 1970):
(b) A limited partner shall not be deemed to take part in the control of the
business by virtue of his possessing or exercising a power, specified in the certificate,
to vote upon matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership, including the
following matters or others of a similar nature:
(I) Election or removal of general partners.
(II) Termination of the partnership.
(III) Amendment of the partnership agreement.
(IV) Sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership.
(c) The statement of powers set forth in subdivision (b) shall not be construed
as exclusive or as indicating that any other powers possessed or exercised by a limited
partner shall be sufficient to cause such limited partner to be deemed to take part
in the control of the business . ...
COMMENTS
the partnership and could be implied from the basic partnership relation-
ship. Since the statute goes on to say that the powers enumerated are not
exclusive,a7 it too is of little help in determining how fully a limited partner
can participate.
Although the cases commenting on this question are not numerous,
there are enough from which to draw some conclusions. Reviewing the
cases decided after a majority of states had adopted the ULPA, 5 one finds
six that are frequently cited for their useful guidelines. A brief statement
of the facts and holdings of these six cases, arranged in order from the least
amount of control exercised to the greatest amount of control exercised,
indicates that courts are deciding the cases in light of the extent and effect
of the limited partner's actual participation. In Rathke v. Griffiths9 the
court was faced with a group that was to act as the "directors" of the
partnership, and one of the limited partners was elected to the position of
a partnership "director." Although the limited partner held this office, a
great deal of evidence was presented showing that he did not carry out
the duties of his office. Based on this lack of actual participation the court
found that the limited partner did not exercise any control and was not
liable as a general partner. In Granger v. Antoyan"° a limited partner
served as the sales manager of an automobile agency. He signed checks
occasionally, but could not hire or fire, buy new cars, or set sales prices or
trade-in values. He was held not to be liable as a general partner. In
Silvola v. Rowlett 1 a limited partner served as the repair shop foreman
and discussed major problems with the general partner. However, since the
general partner had exclusive control, the limited partner was not held
liable. In Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helman" a trustee of a limited partner-
ship interest took part in the hiring of the sales manager and could co-sign
checks, but the sales manager could be fired without his consent and others
could sign checks without him. Citing Granger, the court held that he was
not taking part in control to the extent necessary to be held liable as a
general partner. A much cited case in which the limited partners were held
liable is Holzman v. De Escamilla.4 ' In this case the two limited partners
told the general partner which crops to plant on partnership property, and
signed the partnership checks. Another case in which limited partners
were held liable is Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corp. of America." This case
involved a limited partnership which had been formed for the sole purpose
of organizing and owning a corporation. The limited partners became
directors of the corporation and actively participated in its management.
The court found that stock in the corporation had been issued without
"'ld. § 15507(c).
" The earliest of these cases was decided in 1948. By this time thirty states had adopted the
ULPA. See note 19 supra.
"936 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
4048 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
41 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
4'271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
43 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
44 170 F. Supp. 150, 158-59 (D. Utah 1958) (alternative holding), modified, 265 F.2d 227
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959).
1970]
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the corporation's receiving a just amount of consideration in return, and
held that the limited partners were liable as general partners.
Whether or not a limited partner exercises indirect control merely
through ownership of voting stock, so that he could be held liable as a
general partner, is a very serious concern. In the extreme situation where
the limited partners completely control the corporate general partner, they
could find themselves in trouble due to the rule that is now generally
accepted by the courts that whenever stockholders use their control of a
corporation to achieve injustices, the corporate veil can be pierced and the
stockholders held individually liable.4 Even in situations which are not
extreme, a finding of enough control to hold limited partners liable as
general partners is conceivable where a partner or partners own enough
stock in the corporate general partner to elect at least one director. It
might be argued that by electing a director the shareholders are indirectly
taking part in the control of the business. As yet, an argument based on
indirect control has not been utilized in any reported cases, but the
rationale is logical.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS
The tax classification of limited partnerships with a corporate general
partner requires careful analysis because the intricacies of the legal rela-
tionships created by state law make it difficult to apply the standards set
out in the Treasury Regulations. Under the Internal Revenue Code: "The
term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or
other unincorporated organization ...which is not, within the meaning
of this title a trust or estate or a corporation.' . . . The term 'corporation'
includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies.""
Difficulty is created by the language of the Code in that the partnership
definition excludes corporations, but the corporation definition does not
exclude partnerships. To clarify the definitions, the Internal Revenue
Service has issued a series of regulations setting out standards for each of
the three classes of business organizations-associations (taxable as corpora-
tions), partnerships, and trusts." The regulation applicable to partnerships
states that an organization qualifying as a limited partnership under state
law may be classified for tax purposes as an association if, after the stan-
dards in the regulation dealing with associations are considered, the limited
partnership more closely resembles a corporation than a partnership.'
"' Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Crossman, 323 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1963). But the corporate
fiction should not be disregarded because of identity of corporation, stockholders, and officers and
the fact of ownership of stock in one corporation by another. Roy Overstreet v. Southern Ry.,
371 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1967). To pierce the corporate veil, there must be facts presented to show
that equities justify piercing. In Texas this requires two elements: (1) substantial identity of in-
terests between the individuals and corporation, such that an act of one is an act of the other, and
(2) danger that the corporation will be used or is being used to achieve an inequitable result.
Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134, 141-42 (1967).
46 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (2).
4 7 Id. S 7701 (a) (3).





The regulation dealing with associations sets out six corporate character-
istics: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide
the gains therefrom, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralization of man-
agement, (5) liability limited to assets, and (6) free transferability of
interests.' Since (1) associates, and (2) an objective to carry on a busi-
ness and divide the gain, are characteristics that are common to both part-
nerships and corporations, these two characteristics are immaterial in dis-
tinguishing between the two. 1 Thus, the classification of a limited part-
nership with a corporate general partner as a partnership or as a corporation
for income tax purposes is a fact question to be decided on the basis of the
remaining four characteristics.
The regulations are the result of a long turbulent struggle in the de-
velopment of the application of the income tax laws to various types of
organizations. The rule of using corporate characteristics as the criteria for
the classification of an organization was first established by the Supreme
Court in the 1935 landmark case of Morrissey v. Commissioner!' Faced
with the problem of the proper classification of an organization created
under a declaration of trust, the Court set out the six characteristics of a
corporation and said that if an organization more closely resembled a
corporation than another type of business organization, then it should be
classified as one and taxed accordingly." This rule became known as the
11resemblance test," and regulations embodying the test were promulgated
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.4
When it became apparent to taxpayers during and after World War II
that the increasing personal tax rates made taxation as a corporation ad-
vantageous in some situations, many professional groups created associa-
tions and filed corporate tax returns. The Internal Revenue Service opposed
this movement and in 1954 another landmark case, United States v. Kint-
ner,"' was decided. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was faced
with the question of the proper classification of a group of doctors who
were operating a clinic under "articles of association" which were designed
so that under the standards of Morrissey it could be taxed as a corporation.
The court held for the taxpayers and affirmed a finding that the associa-
tion more closely resembled a corporation. The court thereby rejected the
Service's argument that an organization should be taxed as a partnership
because the state law prohibited a corporation from practicing medicine.
Subsequently, in order to make it more difficult for an unincorporated
association to meet the standards of corporate resemblance, the Service
issued new regulations. These "Kintner Regulations" were issued under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and appeared in 1960." In addition to
specifically directing the courts to look to state law for the determination
11
Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2).
"rid. § 301.7701-2(a) (2).
52296 U.S. 344 (1935).
53 1d. at 360.
54Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 10.3797-1 to -7 (1939); id. 111, §§ 29.3797-1 to -7 (1943); id. 118,
55 39.3797-1 to -7 (1953).
5216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
6Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 412.
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of whether or not a particular corporate characteristic existed,"7 a regula-
tion required that "more corporate characteristics than noncorporate
characteristics" be present before an organization could be classified as an
association."8
After the issuance of the "Kintner Regulations," many states changed
their corporate laws to enable professional organizations to incorporate.
Desiring to allow their professionals the benefit of favorable tax treatment,
state legislatures reasoned that the regulations applied only to unincor-
porated organizations. To counter this action by state legislatures, the
Service amended the "Kintner Regulations" in 1965 specifically to cover
incorporated professional organizations."9 However, the Service has failed
in its attempt to enforce the amended regulations; three circuit courts
have held that the amendment applying to incorporated organizations is
invalid."' In August of 1969, the Service conceded that organizations of
professionals organized under state professional corporation statutes would
be treated as corporations."' Since neither the court decisions nor the change
in the Service's position invalidated the unamended "Kintner Regulations,"
they must logically be considered as the criteria for classifying a limited
partnership with a corporate general partner, and these regulations set forth
each of the four distinguishing corporate characteristics in detail.
III. CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS
Continuity of Life. The first of the four corporate characteristics, con-
tinuity of life, is explained by a regulation as follows:
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dis-
solution .... If the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner of a
limited partnership causes a dissolution of the partnership, unless the re-
maining general partners agree to continue the partnership or unless all re-
maining members agree to continue the partnership, continuity of life does
not exist."'
The regulation adds that if a member has the power under local law to
dissolve the partnership, there is no continuity of life, and accordingly, a
limited partnership subject to a statute based upon or similar to the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act lacks this corporate characteristic." The
ULPA provision concerning the power to dissolve states that "the retire-
ment, death or insanity of a general partner dissolves the partnership, unless
7 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (c) (1960).
aid. § 301.7701-2 (a) (3).
59 Id. § 301.7701-1 (c) (1965) was amended to cover these groups; id. § 301.7701-2(h) was
added to make it almost impossible for them to qualify as associations; and id. § 301.7701-2 (g), an
illustration of an association that had been approved, was deleted from the list of examples. T.D.
6797, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553.
00Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d
888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
01
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
"
2 Technical Information Release 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969), formalized in Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 13.
6
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the business is continued by the remaining general partners . . . .' In a
limited partnership with a corporation as the sole general partner, there
are no remaining general partners to continue the business if the corpora-
tion for some reason becomes defunct. Even where the limited partners
control the corporation, making it unlikely that the corporation will with-
draw, it could still become bankrupt and dissolution would result. " As a
result, it seems that a limited partnership with a corporate general partner
organized in a ULPA state could not comply with the regulation's stan-
dard for the corporate characteristic of continuity of life.
Centralized Management. The second corporate characteristic, centralized
management, is defined by a regulation as "concentration of continuing
exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of
the organization which do not require ratification by members of such or-
ganization. ' The regulation states that if subject to a statute correspond-
ing to the ULPA, the limited partnership does not generally have central-
ized management; but the regulation further states that the partnership
does have centralized management if substantially all the, interests" in the
partnership are owned by the limited partners. "' This conclusion is based on
the reasoning that while centralized management is a characteristic of a lim-
ited partnership, the type of management is a different type of centralized
management from that of a corporation. Centralized management in the
corporate sense means management in a representative capacity, i.e., direc-
tors manage a corporation, but as representatives of the stockholders. In
the limited partnership sense, centralized management means that the
general partner has the exclusive management power,"0 subject only to the
fiduciary duty he owes to the other partners." He should primarily be act-
ing in his own behalf. The regulation recognizes that if the limited part-
ners own substantially all the interests of the partnership, then the general
partner can only be acting on their behalf. If the corporate general partner
is controlled by the limited partner, the corporation would be acting in a
representative capacity and the partnership would possess this corporate
management characteristic. Factors which might be considered in evaluat-
ing the interest of the corporate general partner in a limited partnership
are (1) its capital contribution in relation to that of the limited partners,
(2) its percentage of partnership profits or income, (3) its services per-
formed, and (4) the limited partners' control of the corporate general
" UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 20.
66 11 U.S.C. § 23 (1965). When all general partners are adjudged bankrupt, so is the partnership.
6 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960).
" The term "interests" is not defined by the Regulations.
"
9 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1960).
" UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9. A general partner has all the rights and powers
of a partner in a partnership without limited partners except that without written consent or
ratification by all the limited partners, he may not: (a) contravene the certificate, (b) make it
impossible to carry on the business, (c) confess to a judgment against the partnership, (d) possess
or assign partnership property other than for a partnership purpose, (e) admit another general
partner, (f) admit a limited partner, unless given the right by the certificate, and (g) continue
the business on the death, retirement or insanity of another general partner, unless given the power
to do so by the certificate.
71 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18-23.
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partner. Therefore, in order for a limited partnership with a corporate
general partner to avoid having corporate centralized management under
the regulation, the limited partners should not own substantially all the
interests of the partnership and should not control the corporation. Provid-
ing such independence for the corporate general partner also strengthens
the classification of the organization as a partnership under state law.
Limited Liability. A regulation defines the third corporate characteristic,
limited liability, as the existence of no member who is personally liable for
claims against the organization under local law."2 Further, the regulation
defines personal liability as a creditor's ability to seek satisfaction from the
members as individuals when the organization's assets are insufficient to
satisfy his claim. The regulation adds that in the case of a limited partner-
ship subject to a statute corresponding to the ULPA, personal liability
exists as to each general partner, except in partnerships in which the gen-
eral partner has no substantial assets other than his interest in the partner-
ship."3 It then specifically discusses a corporation as the general partner by
stating that personal liability exists if the corporation has substantial assets
other than its interest in the partnership which could be reached by a
partnership creditor." Thus, the regulation recognizes the practical situa-
tion that may very well exist when a corporation is the general partner.
Since only the general partner has liability beyond his interest in the part-
nership under the ULPA,7' if the corporate general partner has no other
assets than its partnership interest, creditors would have to look only to
assets of the partnership. This is precisely the situation a creditor would
face in dealing with a corporation, so the corporate characteristic would be
present. The appropriate manner by which a limited partnership with a
corporate general partner would avoid the corporate characteristic of
limited liability under the regulation standard is for the corporation to
have substantial assets"0 other than its interest in the partnership.
Another consideration is whether or not any limited partner is liable as
a general partner. Under the ULPA, possible liability could result in several
situations: a limited partner's name is part of the firm name;77 a limited
partner holds himself out to be a general partner;" the partnership is
defectively organized and upon discovering it, the limited partner does
not renounce his interest in the profits;7" and as discussed earlier, a limited
partner takes part in the control of the business." If any of these occurred,
7 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960).
7aid. § 301.7701-2(d) (2).
74 Id.
" UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §5 9-10.
70 According to the unofficial position of the Service, a corporate general partner should have
a net worth equal to the greater of $250,000 or 10% of the partnership capitalization. See note 110
infra.
77 UNIFoRM LrMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 5 (2).7
81d. § 16.
7id. 5 11.
"Id. 5 7. See text following note 45 supra. Another situation which gives rise to liability
greater than one's contribution is where a limited partner is compelled to guarantee partnership
loans, but the amount of liability would be definite, not unlimited.
[Vol. 24
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the limited partner would have personal liability." The imposition of
unlimited liability is, under the Regulations, a partnership, not a corporate
characteristic." However, the imposition of liability on limited partners
because of indirect control through stock ownership would also have the
effect of creating the corporate type of centralized management, because
where the limited partners control a director he would be acting in a
representative capacity for them." The net result of such a case, where
limited partners were held liable as general partners because of the exercise
of indirect control, would seem to be that the organization would gain the
corporate characteristic of centralized management, but lose the corporate
characteristic of limited liability. In such a case, because a limited partner-
ship under the ULPA cannot have the corporate continuity of life in the
Service's view, 4 it would seem that the partnership should still not be
classified as an association as it would not have three corporate character-
istics."
Free Transferability. A regulation defines the fourth corporate character-
istic, free transferability of interests, as: "Each of its members or those
members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization have
the power, without the consent of other members, to substitute for
themselves in the same organization a person who is not a member of the
organization . . . [and] to confer upon his substitute all the attributes
of his interest in the organization."" The regulation also recognizes as a
modified form of free transferability, an agreement requiring a member
to first offer to sell the interest to the other members at its fair market
value before transferring to someone who is not a member."' However, the
regulation directs that such rights of first refusal be given less significance
than the unmodified forms of free transferability." The regulation standard
is such that under the ULPA a limited partnership normally would not
have this corporate characteristic. If the corporate general partner owns
substantially all the interest in the partnership, this standard would not be
met. The ULPA states that a limited partner's interest is assignable, but also
states that the assignee is not admitted to all the rights of the transferor
unless all the members consent or the certificate gives the assignor the
power to confer all his rights." Thus, where the limited partners own
substantially all the partnership interests, a specific prohibition against
transfer is unnecessary. If the certificate merely follows this provision of
the ULPA requiring consent of all the members to allow an assignee to
" Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960): "Personal liability means that a creditor of an
organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of the organization to the extent that
the assets of such organization are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim."
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960).
8 See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
'4See notes 63-66 supra, and accompanying text.
"5See note 58 supra.
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960).
'
7 id. § 301.7701-2(e) (2).
"8 Id.
" UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 19(4).
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become a substituted partner,' ° the partnership would not meet the stan-
dard for this corporate characteristic.
According to the regulations, an organization must have "more corpor-
ate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics" to be classified as an
association.9' The reason for this particular wording is that, as pointed out
previously, the regulations were designed to make it difficult for partner-
ships to achieve corporate tax treatment. The regulation states that if a
limited partnership has centralized management and free transferability of
interests but lacks continuity of life and limited liability, absent any other
characteristics that are significant in determining classification," it will not
be classified as an association." Thus, under these regulations, as long as a
limited partnership possesses less than three of the four corporate character-
istics, in the past it has been classified as a partnership."
9 Under id. § 19(2), a substituted partner is a person admitted to all the rights of a limited
partner.
9 Treas. Reg. S 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
92 There is no indication of what is meant by this clause. The trend since Morrissey v. Com-
missioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), has been to concentrate on the four, excluding (1) associates,
and (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains, since both of these are common to
partnerships and corporations. For examples of what might be considered other characteristics, see
notes 100-02 and 106 infra, and accompanying text.
STreas. Reg. 5 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
141d. S 301.7701-3(b)(2) presents two examples to illustrate the principles involved; they are
placed side by side for comparison and analysis:
Example (1) Example (2)
Facts Applicable to Both
Three individuals who will be the general partners form an organization which
qualifies as a limited partnership under state law. Its purpose is to acquire and operate
commercial and investment property for profit. The limited partners contribute a
total of $5,000,000.
Life
Life is 20 years, but the death, in- Life is 40 years, unless a general
sanity, or retirement of a general part- partner dies, becomes insane, or retires,
ner prior to the end of 20 years will but in the event of one of these, the
dissolve the organization. remaining general partners may con-
tinue the business for the balance of
the 40 years.
Management
The general partners have exclusive The general partners have exclusive
authority to manage the affairs of the control over management of the busi-
organization but can act only upon the ness.
unanimous consent of all of them.
Liability
Each of the general partners invests Each of the general partners invests
$100,000 and is personally capable of $50,000 and has means to satisfy the
assuming a substantial part of the obli- business obligations of the organization
gations to be incurred by the organiza- to a substantial extent.
tion.
Transferability of Interest
A limited partner (there are 30 with The limited partners' interests (there
a minimum contribution of $100,000) are 900 limited partners with a maxi-
may assign his right to receive a share mum contribution of $10,000) are
of the profits and a return of his con- freely transferable.
tribution, but his assignee does not be-
come a substituted partner except with
the unanimous consent of the general
partners.
The regulation concludes that both of the examples will be classified as partnerships for all purposes
of the Internal Revenue Code. It states that in example (1) the limited partnership has the cor-
porate characteristic of centralized management since substantially all the interests in the organiza-
tion are owned by the limited partners; it does not have the characteristics of continuity of life,
limited liability, and free transferability of interest. The regulation states that the limited partner-
COMMENTS
Application of the Regulations. The leading case discussing the application
of the standards to an actual fact situation, and a case to which the In-
ternal Revenue Service has acquiesced, is Glensder Textile Co. v. Commis-
sioner.5  Glensder Textile Co. was a limited partnership established in 1936
under the New York Uniform Limited Partnership Act' by the four gen-
eral partners of an old ordinary partnership, redistributing the $300,000
net worth between themselves as general partners and their wives and
children as limited partners. The general partners' contributions totalled
$125,000 and they were to receive a proportionate 5/12ths of the profits.
The other $175,000 net worth belonged to the limited partners who were
to receive a proportionate 7/12ths of the profits. There was no question
as to the validity of the ownership of the various interests. The Commis-
sioner contended that the limited partnership more closely resembled a
corporation. Based on the New York statutes"7 and the partnership certifi-
cate, the court found that the organization did not more closely resemble
a corporation because it lacked the necessary corporate characteristics. The
court found that although the certificate gave the remaining general part-
ners the right to continue the business on the death, retirement, or insanity
of one or more of them, it was not "analogous to the chartered life of a
corporation which continues regardless of the death or resignation of its
directors or stockholders.""8 The continuity was contingent, giving the
partners the right to continue, but not insuring that they would continue.
If they did decide to continue, there was, in effect, a new partnership. This
does not comply with the standard set out in the regulation. The court also
found that although centralized control by the general partners existed,
it was not the type which made them analogous to directors. They acted
in their own interests, which constituted 5/12ths of the partnership, and
they could not be removed by the limited partners.
Further, the court found that limited liability did not exist in the cor-
porate sense. The court stated that the limited liability of the limited part-
ner should not be the final criterion. It is important that the persons in
control of the partnership activities were the general partners who, under
the statutes, had unlimited liability. The court also noted that should a
limited partner enter into business activity, he would become liable as a
general partner. In discussing the transferability of interests, the court
pointed out that the limited partners, under the certificate, could assign
their interests and had the power to confer upon the assignee the rights of a
substituted limited partner if they chose to do so. However, the court
noted that there were no mechanics provided for free transferability
ship in example (2) has the corporate characteristics of centralized management since the three
general partners exercise exclusive control over the management of the business and substantially all
of the interests in the organization are owned by the limited partners. Also, the limited partnership
has free transferability of interests since substantially all of the interests in the organization are
represented by transferable certificates owned by limited partners. It does not have the corporate
characteristics of continuity of life and limited liability.
9s46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acquiesced in 1942-1 CUM. BULL. 8.
"
6 N.Y. PARTNFRSHII' LAW §§ 90-119 (McKinney 1948).
97 id.
9846 B.T.A. at 185.
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through certificates representing shares. The court also noted that if a
limited partner merely assigned his interest without substitution, the
assignee's position "would bear no resemblance to a corporate stockholder's
status."" Finally, the court pointed out that the general partner's interest
was not transferable any more than was one in a general partnership.
The court went on to consider other characteristics of the partnership
which could have a bearing on its classification. In further discussing the
classification of the organization, the court stated that it seemed immaterial
that the limited partnership could hold the title in real estate in the part-
nership name °" because under another statute partnership property is held
by the partners as tenants in partnership; 0 ' therefore, whether the title is
held in the name of a partner or the partnership, the equitable title is in the
name of the several partners. Further, the court pointed out that a limited
partnership may not sue in its own name; the general partners are the
proper party plaintiffs.0 2
Another illustrative case involving the classification of limited partner-
ships is Riggs v. Commissioner. 3 In that case the tax court was presented
a controversy in which the taxpayer dissolved a corporation owned by him-
self and his son and created a limited partnership in 1938.104 The Commis-
sioner contended that the partnership possessed each of the corporate char-
acteristics and should be classified as an association. He emphasized his
contention that the limited partnership had continuity of life and centrali-
zation of management, which characteristics were all that the regulations
existing prior to Kintner required. The court found that the partnership
did not have continuity of life in the corporate sense. Citing Glensder, the
court stated that the partnership agreement providing that if any partner
ceased to be associated with the partnership the business would continue
under the management of the remaining partner or partners merely pro-
vided for the nonliquidation, which is not a rarity in partnership arrange-
ments. The court found that the certificate giving exclusive management
powers to the taxpayer and his son and giving the taxpayer the controlling
vote in case of disagreement did not create centralized management. The
court pointed out that "[I]t is not uncommon for a partnership to have
a managing partner .... Certainly ... this veto power is not so rare a pro-
vision in partnership agreements as to require our holding that this enter-
prise was more than an ordinary partnership.'
' 5
The court simply rejected the Commissioner's argument that the sharing
of profits and losses in a certain percentage is not an attempt to limit lia-
bility as it only affects the partners, not third persons not party to the
agreement. The court also found that since there were no certificates of
99Id. at 186.
"
0 0 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 12(3) (McKinney 1948).
10'Id. 5 51(1).
'02 Id. § 115.
'36 T.C. 889 (1946).
'"°A certificate was filed on Jan. 6, 1944, pursuant to an Arkansas statute adopted in 1943.
ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 65-302 (1966).
'056 T.C. at 897.
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ownership or beneficial interests issued and that since new partners could
enter the firm only with the consent of all the other partners, free trans-
ferability of interest did not exist. The court noted that the books were
prepared and kept in accordance with recognized rules of partnership ac-
counting and that they contained none of the accounts peculiar to cor-
porations. It also stated that customers, banks, and other business connec-
tions regarded the organization as a partnership and specifically pointed
out that signature cards used when the bank account was opened were
those used for partnerships and individuals, and the bank did not require a
corporate resolution authorizing the withdrawal of funds.' " The court
summed up by saying that, if anything, the taxpayer's case is stronger than
that of George Bros. & Co., a case involving a general partnership which
the Internal Revenue Service tried, but failed, to have classified as an asso-
ciation."'
IV. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE POSITION
The position that the Internal Revenue Service will take with regard to
the classification of a limited partnership with a corporate general partner
is uncertain. There are no litigated cases involving this type of organiza-
tion in which any opinion is expressed, and the Service has not published an
official policy. Until now the Service's efforts have been primarily con-
cerned with challenging associations' and professional corporations' at-
tempts at attaining corporate taxation. Having lost, they may now feel
free to reverse their position in applying the regulations to limited partner-
ships with a sole corporate general partner.
The author understands that the Service's current position is as follows.
Officers and directors of the corporate general partner can be limited part-
ners, but the limited partners cannot own in excess of twenty per cent of
the stock of the corporate general partner, and no packages of stock in the
corporate general partner and limited partnership interests, or warrants
to purchase stock of the corporate general partner and limited partnership
interests, can be offered. In addition, the minimum capitalization of the
corporate general partner after the underwriting has been completed and
throughout the existence of the limited partnership should be fifteen per
cent of the total capital of the limited partnership on the first $1,666,667,
at least $250,000 if the total capital is between $1,666,667 and $2,500,000,
and ten per cent of the total capital if the total capital exceeds $2,500,000.
The percentage is computed on the fair market value of the corporation's
assets including its interest in the limited partnership, and the net worth
requirement is non-cumulative where the corporate general partner is the
general partner of more than one venture.
so6 id.
107 41 B.T.A. 287 (1940). Chilhowee Mills, 47 B.T.A. 682 (1942), is another case involving the
classification of general partnerships in which the IRS was unsuccessful. Cases in which limited
partnerships were classified as partnerships are Commissioner v. Western Constr. Co., 191 F.2d 401
(9th Cir. 1951), and Taywal Ltd., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1044 (1942); both cited Glensder, but
neither discussed characteristics in detail. No cases were found in which a limited partnership formed
under a state's limited partnership statutes was classified as an association.
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Tax Management has previously published its understanding that the
Internal Revenue Service would rule favorably on the qualification of the
limited partnership as a "partnership" if the limited partners did not own,
directly or indirectly, more than twenty per cent of the outstanding stock
of the corporate general partner or a corporation which is affiliated with
the corporate general partner within the definition of "affiliated group" '
in section 1504 of the Code.' Tax Management has also suggested that, in
addition, the Service would rule that a limited partner having a corporate
general partner would not be an association taxable as a corporation if the
corporate general partner had a net worth, measured by book value, at
least equal to $250,000, or ten per cent of the capitalization of the limited
partnership, whichever were greater."'
The uncertainty of the Service's attitude, due to its not publishing a
ruling, is creating serious problems. A preliminary prospectus for the
shares of stock in a corporation which plans to form a series of limited
partnerships to conduct oil and gas exploration stated: "Because of present
federal income tax policies, no limited partner in the Fund or any future
limited partnership formed for similar purposes . . . may own, directly or
indirectly, any shares of the common stock of the Company, including any
of the shares ... offered hereby." ''1  Further, the prospectus explained that
the purpose of the restriction is to assure all limited partners that there will
be no common ownership which will adversely affect the partnership status
of the organization and, as a result, the pass-through of deductions. 12
The Service's position is difficult to understand. The rules for classifying
organizations are well established. It seems as though the only thing that
identity of limited partners and stockholders would do is establish indirect
control which would not in itself be determinative of classification."1 The
amount of a corporation's net worth only goes to the "substantial interest"
of the general partner. Whether or not a corporate general partner has a
substantial interest does affect the characteristics of limited liability and
centralized management, but according to regulations the general partner's
lacking a substantial interest would prohibit the corporate characteristic
of limited liability" ' but would add the corporate characteristic of central-
ized management."' This situation, as with the limited partners, would not
in itself be determinative under the long-standing Morrissey doctrine. The
Internal Revenue Service appears to be trying to discourage the use of the
limited partnership with a corporate general partner by withholding a
ruling that it will recognize them as partnerships for tax purposes.
10 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 1504 defines "affiliated group" as one or more chains of includable
corporations connected to a common parent corporation through stock ownership. The stock owner-
ship of the various corporations must be 80% of all classes of non-voting stock.
10 69-21 TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM 8, Tidbit 1 (1969).
110 69-26 TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM 13, Tidbit 3 (1969).
"'Shop Talk, Coping with No-Ruling Policy on Limited Partnerships, 31 J. TAXATION 319(1969).
112 Id.
a Indirect control would normally only have an effect on limited liability and the type of
centralized management which the partnership possesses. See text following note 83 supra.
"
4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (2) (1960); see notes 72-74 supra, and accompanying text.
"
2 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1960); see notes 67-71 supra, and accompanying text.
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Even though the Service does withhold ruling, it may not be successful
in litigation over the classification of those limited partnerships formed
under the ULPA with some attention given the regulations in wording the
partnership certificate. The reason is that regulations require that a part-
nership possess three of the four corporate characteristics before it is to be
classified as an association."' Even if the Service, because of its loss in at-
tacking professional corporations, attempts to go back to the pre-Kintner
regulations, which stressed continuity of life and centralized manage-
ment,17 it would still have difficulty where the taxpayer words his agree-
ment and certificate carefully. " 8
V. CONCLUSION
Limited partnerships with a corporate general partner are useful as
vehicles for raising the large amounts of capital needed for types of enter-
prises such as oil and gas exploration and real estate development. They
offer an alternative to conducting the business in the corporate form while
still giving investors the protection of limited liability. There are prac-
tical differences between a limited partnership and a corporation. Limited
partners do not participate in management even as much as shareholders
do in electing directors, and limited partnerships are usually less flexible
because of the narrower scope of purposes in a limited partnership certi-
ficate and the frequent need to amend it, contrasted to the wide range of
powers enjoyed by a corporation under its charter. Other differences are
more technical than practical. The corporate characteristic of free trans-
ferability of interests can be attained or avoided by wording the partner-
ship certificate accordingly. The provisions of the ULPA which technically
deny partnerships continuity of life and limited liability can be circum-
vented, for all practical purposes, by giving the remaining partners the
power to continue after a technical dissolution and by choosing a general
partner with limited assets. Nevertheless, the distinctions and standards set
out in the Regulations are such that it would indeed be difficult for a lim-
ited partnership organized under the: ULPA or similar statute to be cor-
rectly classified as an association for tax purposes. The fact that the Regu-
lations were designed to prevent partnerships from being classified as
associations, will make it difficult for the Internal Revenue Service to apply
them in a manner so as to now have partnerships classified as associations.
Neither will the Service be able arbitrarily to create new standards under
which partnerships would be classified as associations, as evidenced by the
litigation concerning professional corporations."
In order to avoid a possible round of litigation similar to that concern-
ing professional corporations, some definite guidelines should be developed
116 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (3) (1960).
117Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-4 (1953), states that if an organization is not interrupted by
the death of a member or a change of ownership, and if management is centralized, "such organiza-
tion is an association, taxable as a corporation."
"' Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), and other cases decided prior to the 1954 Code
were decided in favor of the taxpayer. See notes 95-107 supra, and accompanying text.
... See notes 60-62 supra, and accompanying text.
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after a thorough study has been made of the limited partnership with a
corporate general partner-its place in the economy, weighing the eco-
nomic benefits provided by it against the loss of revenues due to the tax
benefits that may be derived from it. Limited partnerships, including those
with a corporate general partner, do offer economic as well as tax benefits.
Many expensive business undertakings would not be possible without the
large amount of money that private individuals are willing to invest, but
individuals with a great deal of money are acutely concerned with income
taxation and will be more disposed to invest in business organizations
which have favorable tax treatment. Taxation has long been used by the
government to accomplish other things besides raising revenues. It is evi-
dent from the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that the government is trying to
influence the area in which investments are made because it lowered the
oil and gas depletion allowance percentage and reduced the depreciation
available on everything except for residential rental property, which can
still be depreciated by the double declining balance method."
When interest rates drop and increasing amounts of money are made
available for investments,121 much of it could be directed into limited
partnerships with a corporate general partner. Hopefully, more definite
guidelines will be set forth by the Internal Revenue Service for investors
and developers desiring to make use of these organizations. If the Service
does not act, Congress should.
"'See note 9 supra.
iat At present, mortgage companies are not making a great many real estate loans. The loans
which are made are usually with a rate of interest between 9V/% and 10% plus participation by
the mortgage company. Interview with John Tatum of M.P. Crum Co., a mortgage banker in
Dallas, Texas, Apr. 6, 1970.
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